Hamp Archives – Refinance – Mortgage Refinancing Rates And Information

HAMP’s March Loan Modification Report; A Review

April 15th, 2010 No comments

Obama’s Loan Modification programs have been criticized for their lack of results. But what are these results? The March Servicer Performance Report is fresh off the press, so let us have a quick look at what it has to say.

The highlights for HAMP are that more than 230,000 mortgages have been permanently modified. 108,000 loans have been approved by the lender and are simply waiting for the borrower to sign the final papers. That gives us a total 338,000 loans with permanent modifications. The other big newsbyte is that over 1.1 million trial loan modifications are active under the HAMP program. As you all know these trial loan modifications last for three months. If at the end of this period the borrower has provided all the relevant documentation and is up-to-date with his mortgage payments he is given a permanent loan modification. That is, of course, the theory.

According to MHA these loan modifications represent over $3 billion dollars in savings for monthly mortgage payments. The bad news on the report is the number of trial modifications added in the March has dropped to 57,000 from 72,000 in February. The reason for this, according to HAMP’s spin, is that servicers and lenders are requiring upfront documentation before trial modifications start. This has been a bone of contention with critics of the program that see the trial loan modification (without prequalifying the necessary documents) as a way of getting troubled borrowers to pay for three extra months and then deny them the loan modification on the basis of pending paperwork .

The flip side on the reduction of new trial modifications is there has been an increase of 15% in the number of permanent loan modifications approved in March. The story MHA is spinning is that numbers are dropping because of prequalifying filters servicers are introducing. The biggest issue with the Making Home Affordable Program is it doesn’t tackle the real issues of the housing crisis. Interest rate reductions of loans can substantially reduce the cost of a mortgage. A drop of 1% translates into savings $1,500 in most cases. The problem is that high interest mortgages are not the biggest problem any longer. Unemployment is.

MHA understands this and is providing alternatives programs to HAMP that provide specific aid to unemployed homeowners. The latest program for unemployed started this month. It provides loan modifications of mortgage payments to 31% of the unemployed worker’s income for a 3 to 6-month period. The question is will these measures provide real aid to those that need it and not just throw good money at lenders and servicers with little long term benefits for borrowers.

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The Obama Administration Has a Brainstorming Session with the Hardest Hit States; What Should the TARP Fund Be Spent On?

April 12th, 2010 No comments

When everybody was saying HAMP’s loan modification was dead as a dodo the Obama Administration has revamped the program under a new Hardest Hit Fund enhancement. This enhancement promises to allocate $600 million from the TARP fund to finance innovative ways of keeping people in their homes or avoid outright foreclosures. This help has been focused on specific states that have been particularly hard hit by the financial crisis. Throwing more money at an idea is not really a novel concept. What is kind of novel is that the Administration is asking for suggestions on how to spend it best.

The first HFA initiative targeted five states based on the rate of decline in house prices (over 20%). The idea was to help people with underwater and subprime mortgages. However, the situation has changed, the fastest demographic joining the list of troubled homeowners are unemployed homeowners with prime mortgages but with not enough income to pay for them. That is why the Administration is now targeting states with a high rate of unemployment (over 12%). There are five states that comply with this criterion: North Carolina, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Ohio, and Oregon. The key though, is that each state can use the fund as they see fit, well, within reason.

These states can now apply for this enhancement of the existing HFA fund. What gives this new enhancement an actual chance of being useful is that each state has some freedom in deciding how to use the money. The program does qualify the allowable uses of the money, but it gives officials in each state the freedom to decide the particulars. The guidelines are rather broad: 1) Protect home values, 2) Preserve homeownership and promote jobs and economic growth, and 3) Provide public accountability.

This gives states a chance to find creative ways to use the money in the most effective way. Relying on the creative thinking of government officials might or might not be a stroke of genius; time will tell. The administration has encouraged eligible states to submit proposals on how the cash should be spent in their counties. The schemes the TARP fund could be used for includes:

1) Unemployment Programs. This is actually already in place. Troubled homeowners that are currently unemployed will be provided with a temporary loan modification, or forbearance period, where the mortgage payments will be reduced to 31% of their current income.

2) Loan Modifications. This is a rather boring alternative, which will simply give financial institutions and lenders more money for accepting loan modifications.

3) Principal balance reduction. This is a more interesting option; reducing the balance of a loan to offset underwater mortgages and allow for further modifications.

4) Second Lien Reductions. This is also something now done by the HAFA program. It basically means junior lien holders of mortgages are paid off / compensated for allowing a short sale to go ahead even though they know too well they will not get a dime from it.

These are some of the ideas already on the table; the hope is that new and wonderful suggestions will crop up like some kind of multi-state brainstorm. What would you do with the cash? Obama seems to be open to suggestions.

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Categories: Economy, Interest Rates, loan modification, Mortgage News/Insight, Mortgage's, Refinance Tags: Hamp

Treasury Moves The Goal Posts of HAMP and Lowers Expectations for the Loan Modification Program.

March 25th, 2010 No comments

HAMP, the Obama administration foremost measure against the wave of foreclosures triggered by the financial meltdown is not working as planned. What do you do when something does not work as planned? You clarify how it was never designed to work like that anyway, and patiently explain what it really was meant to do.

When HAMP, the Making Homes Affordable Plan started, the Treasury Department claimed it would help as many as four million troubled homeowners. However the revised projections of the program now are that it will only help 1.5 to 2 million borrowers.

Is this a failure for the government? Of course, it depends how you look at it. Treasury’s spin on it is that the 4 million homeowners the program set out to help did not refer to the number of borrowers that would receive a modification but to those that would be offered one, whether they finally got it or not.

Analysts, even some from within TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program) are skeptical of if simply offering the possibility of a loan modification is a meaningful or even useful goal. It would be like a shelter home setting the goal of preparing 1,000 meals but not necessarily feeding 1000 hungry people.

The HAMP program was launched by Obama’s administration with the goal of lowering the mortgage payments of troubled homeowners by paying lenders to carry out loan modifications on the mortgages of troubled borrowers.

The bill was going to be footed by tapping 50 billion dollars from TARP and 25 billion dollars from Fannie and Freddie, the government controlled mortgage financing juggernauts. However, so far only 200,000 borrowers have a permanent modification and only 31 million dollars have been used from the billion earmarked for the program.

The Treasury has been quick to point out that permanent loan modifications should not be the only measuring stick of success. There are, Treasure claims, other avenues that are being pursued to help troubled homeowners avoid foreclosure. For instance, Treasury is now looking into the use of short sales, where the owner sells the home for less than the balance of the mortgage, as alternatives to foreclosures.

A fairer measurement of success, again according to Treasury, would be to see how many eligible homeowners are helped to avoid foreclosure and “relocate to a more suitable home” without having to undergo the embarrassment and pain of a foreclosure.

I believe most homeowners do not care so much about the embarrassment of foreclosing as the pain of losing their home and having to move. Whether you swallow the spin coming from the Treasury Department or not, there is no doubt the wave of foreclosures that is hitting our economy has no quick fixes. The expectations the HAMP program started with were obviously too optimistic, and a reality check was well overdo. The real question is not if HAMP is reaching its goals or not, but what measures CAN or SHOULD (not always the same thing) be taken now to help the plight of troubled homeowners.

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The Obama Loan Modification Plan, An Overview

March 2nd, 2010 No comments

This Thursday the Obama Loan Modification Plan, HAMP, will be a year old. It was on the 4^th of March, 2009 that the Obama administration started the largest and most ambitious homeowner’s aid package since the 1930s. The goal was to stop the wave of foreclosures that was destroying the housing market. The Government’s reply was huge. The aim was to help four million homeowners avoid foreclosure and they were willing to spend $75 billion to do so. How are things looking as we approach HAMP’s first birthday. By December 2009 there were nearly 760,000 loans in the trial stage of the program. This three month trial stage is designed to test if the homeowner will pay his modified loan for three months before the modification is final. However, only 31,000 homeowners had actually received a permanent loan modification by the end of 2009. Of these many had seen only the slightest of changes to their monthly payments. The Obama administration realized they needed to do more, and quickly. This triggered a list of amendments and countermeasures designed to speed up the process and open the doors to more homeowners. Soon it became obvious that the issue was not the interest rates of bad loans that were hurting homeowners but the increasing rates of unemployment that was reducing the income of homeowners that could not afford to pay for their mortgage. In fact, the fastest growing demographic in the foreclosure market consisted of homeowners with prime loans that had lost their jobs. From the beginning of the program, the Treasury Department made it very clear that the program would not cater for families that no longer had an income because of losing their job. The aid was focused on families whose income had shrunk but could still afford the payments of a modified loan. Another issue was the complexity of the loan modification process. Homeowners complained that mortgage servicers were not consistent, lost important documents regularly and did not provide accurate information. Mortgage servicers on the other hand explained that homeowners often did not provide the right documentation and were less than honest when filling forms. Treasury reacted by simplifying the system and providing greater concessions to lenders and mortgage servicers. Industry leaders often made the valid point that the HAMP plan incentives did not cover the costs and it was better for them to continue charging fees from delinquent homeowners and foreclosure proceedings than approve loan modifications. The reaction was to increase the incentives and the arm twisting of lenders that would not comply with the program’s expectations. The incentives did become rather generous for both servicers and borrowers. Every loan a servicer modified came with a $1,000 upfront payment, with an extra thousand dollars every year the homeowners was current on payments. This means the Treasury will pay $1,000 every year the borrower is not delinquent, to reduce the loan balance. However the biggest subsidy was offered to reduce the actual monthly payments of mortgages. If the lender could reduce the monthly payments to 38% of the borrower’s income the government would pay for the cost of reducing the payments to 31% of the family’s income. The problem is that these measures have not been sufficient to stem the increase in foreclosures and new guidelines are being worked on to look for a solution. Unfortunately the prospects do not look good for the second year of the Obama Loan Modification Plan.

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Loan Modifications Are Not Working, We Need A Plan B

January 20th, 2010 No comments

That is what John Taylor, chief executive of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition feels anyway. Mr Taylor’s organization represents local organizations that are working towards affordable housing and community development. John Talyor like most Americans, including the millions facing foreclosure, and the 700,000+ that are on a loan modification trial and have not been granted a permanent loan modification, is not happy with the performance of the government’s loan modification program HAMP.

Of course he has another idea, a plan B as he calls it. He wants the U.S Treasury to buy out troubled mortgages for a discount value and then soften the payment terms for borrowers by even reducing the principal balance of the mortgage to something closer to the current value of the home. After the mortgages are modified into a more sustainable form the government could then sell them to investors.

The good news is that according to Mr. Taylor this could be done with a few hundred million dollars and should be even profitable to the government. This is a far cry from the hundreds of millions that are being thrown at the current loan modification program with very unsatisfactory results.

Interestingly, some private firms, like PennyMac Mortgage Investment Trust, are already doing this, and you know they aren’t doing for the love of neighbor. Taylor says that the Government should get into this business especially since it is because the government is propping the whole mortgage market that companies like PennyMac can even operate.

The downside of this proposal is that Government will probably not be that good at assessing the value of homes and modifying the home values. Another issue is the awkwardness when the government has to foreclose and evict homeowners that can’t pay their mortgage payments even after the loan modification.

Taylor suggests that the Government could cope with these challenges by terminating bad mortgages in relatively more gracious ways by allowing for short sales, where the lender agrees to sell the home for less than the loan balance.

Obviously Taylor’s plan B has its issues and there are no guarantees it will work. However, the Obama Administration needs to look for alternatives to the current HAMP program.

December’s loan modification figures were somewhat encouraging, permanent loan modifications doubling up to 66,465, but still inadequate figures for the wave of foreclosures the mortgage market is facing. The Administration needs to look at a Plan B if it is to provide significant help to the troubled borrowers that need it.

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Wachovia Loan Modifications Help Only 3% and May Damage Your Credit Rating

January 4th, 2010 No comments

Loan Modifications sponsored by Obama’s administration HAMP (Home Affordable Modification Program) program does not a have a very long history but Wachovia has lagged at the bottom of it from the very beginning.

Wachovia has over 82,000 borrowers with home loans, the economy is doing pretty bad which has caused a large percentage of those borrowers struggle to make their payments. However Wachovia has only provided loan modifications for 3% of their struggling borrowers, those 60 days or more behind their payments and that includes borrowers that are still fighting through a loan modification trial. To give you an idea of how many borrowers get through the trial loan modification to date over 750,000 loan modification trials have been filed but under 40,000 have qualified for permanent loan modifications.

Wachovia is not the only large lender and servicer that has poor a poor loan modification conversion but it 3% is bad even at the bottom of the loan modification conversion league.

The reasons for low conversion numbers are complex. Pointing fingers at servicers and banks is easy and the fact that some banks are doing much better than 3% shows that Wachovia and other servicers can do more, however there are many other factors. Loan Modifications do involve paperwork and depend on Net Present Value tests. Borrowers are not always as good at filling and filing paperwork as they would like and the sad truth is that many people don’t qualify for loan modifications under the current rules. For instance banks are only required to approve a loan modification if the Net Present Value test shows that it would be profitable for the bank to grant the loan modification instead of simply continuing with the foreclosure.

Are Wachovia Loan Modifications damaging your credit score?

Another issue with loan modifications is how they affect your credit rating. As most of the borrowers that qualify for loan modifications can a) afford a modified loan payment, b) have a mortgage that is not terribly “underwater” and c) the will and stamina to endure the painful ordeal of a loan modification it is likely they care about their credit rating after having their loan modification approved.

Various horror stories from the “lucky” 3% of Wachovia’s borrowers that qualified for a loan modification have mentioned how Wachovia guaranteed there would be no negative information reported to their credit file to later realize Wachovia had reported them as undergoing Paying Partial Payment Agreement which is actually way worse than being reported for a loan modification program under the current HAMP program.

It is possible that these cases are isolated to “private” agreements between the borrower and Wachovia without falling under the HAMP program, which does not approve of this kind of reporting. This does not change the fact that it is a straight lie and measures should be taken to stop this if it has become a matter of course with Wachovia. Borrowers can easily destroy their credit by becoming delinquent on their loan quite easily on their own without any servicers “help” in the form of a paying partial payment agreement.

It seems that one of the reasons for these complaints is that when Wachovia was bought out by Wells Fargo loan modification terms were changed and that included credit rating report procedures.

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Categories: Economy, Interest Rates, loan modification, Mortgage's, Refinance Tags: Aff, banks, borrowers, Conversion, Credit Rating, Credit Score, Current, Economy, Foreclosure Loan, Hamp, home loans, loan modification, Paperwork, Pointing Fingers, Present Value, Sad Truth, Wachovia

Loan Modification Low Numbers, Why?

December 25th, 2009 No comments

This is the question administration consultants and officials are asking themselves. After using every trick in the book and more to “encourage”, “bribe” and “bully” servicers in providing loan modifications, loan modification conversion rates are still terribly low.

Ineligible Applicants.

Some have reasoned that the reason loan modification conversion rates are so slow is that many borrowers are simply ineligible under the current loan modification program, also called Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). HAMP does condition acceptance into the program, homeowners must be able to afford the modified payments, the cost of housing must not exceed 31% of the households income and the NPV test (Net Present Value) must be passed among other requirements before a loan modification is granted permanently.

Wrong Crisis.

A parallel argument is that the HAMP program is simply targeting the wrong problem. The issue, in the opinion of those that voice this argument, not a mortgage crisis, but a credit or unemployment crisis. It must be granted that with many homeowners their mortgage is the least of their worries or at least only one of many.

This argument seems to be validated by the fact that more and more troubled homeowners have prime loans with excellent interest rates and conditions but are struggling with their mortgages because they are unemployed. Modifying the mortgage payments will not help these homeowners which in most cases aren’t eligible for a modification anyway.

Greedy Servicers.

Some have pointed out that in many cases loan modifications simply don’t make sense for servicers because they cost more than they are worth, at least for servicers. Servicers, often banks, manage mortgages for lenders. They don’t supply the cash but deal with customer service, collect payments and pass them on to the lender or lenders of the mortgage.

Loan Modifications are too expensive.

A similar line of reasoning points to high cost of modifying a loan. Lowering the interest of a loan or reducing the principal can cost lenders tens of thousands of dollars with the added risk that borrowers can re-default despite the money invested in the loan modification. From a business standpoint if can seem logical for banks to say no thanks to government incentives which are often inadequate and cash in on a foreclosure.

If any of these explanations are true of if they all contribute to the program is hard to say. What does seem clear is that we are dealing with a complex crisis that will not be defeated with any one silver bullet. A combination of economic and social measures will be required to fight the housing, credit and unemployment crisis the U.S and world as a whole faces.

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Loan Modifications, A Loose, Lose Story With No Winners

December 23rd, 2009 No comments

Loan Modifications have been touted as the solution to all evils brought about by the latest economic crises and as the worst idea an administration has ever had.

The administration shouts out that the whole point of Loan Modifications is to help the middle class by giving them a break on their underwater mortgages while many commentators claim that it is just one more ploy to funnel money to big bank corporations that have already received billions in bailout money.

How is it that such an apparently simple idea as modifying the interest rates, loan tenure, and if the borrower is really lucky, the loan principal, is received with such opposite feelings?

The reason is that it is a loose, loose program where neither lenders nor borrowers get what they really want. The intention was good when designing the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) but just as the Communist Manifesto sounded great on paper, the reality is that in practice it simply doesn’t work.

As nobody gets what they want everybody suspects it is a ploy to steal their money so nobody makes the effort needed to make it happen. Another way to see it is that the government is not creating the incentives that would make the ploy work.

Borrowers Loose:

The whole Loan Modification Program is based on a three month trial period that must be “passed” before the loan mod is permanent. In order to qualify borrowers must provide proof of income, pay their monthly payments on time every month, after which they must supply more paperwork. This creates a bottleneck where a lot of applications come in, 750,000 seems to be the last count, but only a very few actually make it to permanent loan modification, around 31,000. And of the few that make it even fewer are that much better off. The reason being that when a loan is underwater, or put another way, when a borrower owes more than his house is worth, the only real long term solution is to reduce the principal. If you don’t the borrower still owes more than his house is worth and there is little incentive to pay for an investment that is upside down when the borrower could simply walk away from a sour deal and put his money elsewhere.

Lenders lose:

Many feel that the only winners in the loan modification (a.ka. HAMP) program are corporate banks. One argument explains that the whole program is designed to squeeze three extra months out of underwater borrowers that would otherwise not think about paying another month. Others feel that it is only another way to get money to banks through the incentives the program offers.

The three month trial scam does carry some credibility because it costs the bank little to reduce payments for three months and carry on with foreclosure proceedings. The cost of manning the loan modification and running the paperwork would probably be covered by receiving payments from the three month trial.

However it seems silly to think that the whole program is designed to give bonuses to banks. The government only pays a “bonus” to banks when they complete a permanent loan modification and there has only been 31,000 of them up-to-date. The maximum incentive a bank can receive for a loan modification is around $4,000 over a period of three to four years, which means that in total the government will pay in the next three to four years around $124,000,000. Compare $4,000 with the loss a bank incurs when they reduce the interest rate of a loan which climbs into the tens of thousands plus whatever principal reduction might be involved. Although it is true that foreclosures are also expensive it is not as if the government’s measly incentive is going to make a loan modification a great deal. This is why banks are not in a hurry to carry out loan modifications, in most cases it is bad business, and even when there is a small margin to be made the rate of re-default with modified loans is high and banks might just be kicking the can down the road a few blocks.

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Loan Modifications, 5 Things the Government Is Not Doing But Should

November 4th, 2009 No comments

Mortgage foreclosures are increasing steadily as home values plummet and layoffs are becoming ever more common while homeowners crumble under the weight of mortgages they can no longer afford.
The administration is working hard to increase the number of loan modifications to help out struggling homeowners. However higher unemployment rates are making it hard for homeowners to afford even good prime mortgages loan modifications struggle to improve. Also, foreclosures often prove to be a cheaper alternative for mortgage providers when the real cost of loan modifications is calculated.
So what can be done to fix this situation? Although far from total solutions I will put forward five possible measures. Some would be unpopular, others hard to implement but the truth is that easy fixes are just not there to be found.
1) Mandate Loan Modifications.
Up to now the government has tried to court mortgage providers into making loan modifications. Providing incentives and often footing the entire bill of loan modifications. This could be changed if the administration regulates foreclosures and makes it a legal requirement for banks to offer modifications before they can foreclose a loan or mortgage.
2) Provide Principal Reductions on Existing Loans.

Unless you actually reduce the principal (amount borrowed) of a loan you are not really helping, just lengthening the loan and making it harder regain equity on the home. Equity is the best incentive for homeowners to pay their mortgage payments. If you feel your home is worth more than you owe on it you see it as an investment worth protecting that you can sell at a profit if things get real bad.

3) Ease Accounting Rules for Loan Modifications.

Messy accounting procedures and bureaucracy’s red tape is responsible for much of the cost of loan modifications making them hard to enforce and expensive to make. Even the 500,000 plus loan trials the HAMP program has managed to make ahead of schedule will have to undergo further paperwork and potential bureaucracy pits once the three month trials are finished which will probably cause many of the loan trials to fall through.

4) More Transparent and Uniform Loan Modifications Reports.

Every bank or mortgage provider seems to have their own system to measure eligible borrowers and how they report their loan modifications. This makes it difficult to set uniform procedures, require targets and regulate the efficiency of loan providers.

5) Limit Fees For Borrowers.

Fees charged to borrowers are so high that even if a homeowner falls in difficult times for brief period he/she can fall into a spiral of debt due to the high fees and penalties he or she incurs. Also, loan modifications tend to include expensive fees for the homeowner just to apply for.

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Loan Modifications, Servicers and Who Is Profiting From the Credit Crisis

November 4th, 2009 No comments

The news is full of loan modification horror stories describing how homeowners have struggled for months with lost documents, changing standards, unreasonable loan modification agents and the slow tides of bureaucracy. Bad news does always seem to travel faster and further so you don’t hear half as much about the hundreds of thousands of loans that have been successfully modified.

However the question still remains why loan modifications are moving so slowly if the government is willing to pay the bill for the expenses mortgage servicers and investors have to incur when modifying a loan. Recent studies seem to indicate the reason is that the incentives and handouts the government is making through HAMP and TARP just don’t cover the real cost of modifying the fast increasing volume of loan modification applications.

How can this be so when TARP and HOPE have deep pockets of over 75 billion dollars? The answer seems to lay in the mortgage servicers, the companies that collect monthly mortgage payments and then distribute them to the investors that lent the money in the first place. Mortgage servicers have found it is often cheaper to foreclose on homes than to offer a loan modification even though a loan modification would benefit both the borrower and the investor.

The key is not only the rate of return when managing loans and loan modifications but the expenses related to the operations. The assumptions we generally have as consumers is that foreclosures are a bad deal for everyone. Numbers that are thrown around for example are losses of 10 to 20 percent for lenders on short sales while lenders have to face 20 to 30 cents to the dollar when dealing with foreclosures.

These figures only tell part of the story, mortgage servicers have other ways of measuring profit and often have different priorities. A recent report examined foreclosures between 1995 and 2009 and found that loan servicers made more money by offering forbearance (a period of time where the borrower does not have to make payments so he can consolidate his finances) than by cutting principal or reducing rates of interest, which is what loan modifications do.

This means that when deciding between foreclosure and loan modification loan servicers have to choose between certain loss with loan modifications and potential profit if they foreclose the loan. What would you do? Exactly. This is why loan servicers have been dragging their proverbial feet with loan modifications. Of course there are also other issues to consider like public opinion and bad publicity. The government has tried to use this weapon by publishing loan modification leagues that encourage banks to reorganize their systems to increase loan modifications.

So what is the solution? No easy fixes obviously or they would have already been implemented. However the administration could enforce stricter rules that regulate foreclosure and make loan modifications more attractive like regulating loan originations, mandate loan modifications before foreclosure or have third party loan modification mediation programs that control what mortgage providers do.
The best thing you can do now if you are at risk of foreclosure or behind in your payments is to contact the HOPE program by visiting their website or calling 1-888-995-HOPE.

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Archive

HAMP’s March Loan Modification Report; A Review

The Obama Administration Has a Brainstorming Session with the Hardest Hit States; What Should the TARP Fund Be Spent On?

Treasury Moves The Goal Posts of HAMP and Lowers Expectations for the Loan Modification Program.

The Obama Loan Modification Plan, An Overview

Loan Modifications Are Not Working, We Need A Plan B

Wachovia Loan Modifications Help Only 3% and May Damage Your Credit Rating

Loan Modification Low Numbers, Why?

Loan Modifications, A Loose, Lose Story With No Winners

Loan Modifications, 5 Things the Government Is Not Doing But Should

Loan Modifications, Servicers and Who Is Profiting From the Credit Crisis

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